As social media becomes an important channel for disseminating investment information, this profession, which was originally influential mainly in institutional circles, is increasingly coming to the forefront of public attention. As analysts transition from research reports to social media, how do they ensure their public statements comply with regulatory boundaries?
Securities analysts, in simple terms, are professionals in securities companies who conduct research and provide expert judgments for investors. They track specific industries and companies over the long term, read financial reports, attend research meetings, write research reports, and then convert complex information into viewpoints that can be used as references for investment decisions.
As social media becomes an important channel for disseminating investment information, this profession, which was originally mainly influential in institutional circles, is increasingly coming to the forefront of public attention. What analysts say, how they say it, whether their comments have been reviewed, and whether their expressions are compliant - issues that used to mainly exist in the research report release process - are now also being applied to internet social platforms.
Meanwhile, as institutional commissions decline and industry competition intensifies, analysts face challenges beyond research itself, including serving clients, competing for rankings, and withstanding pressure from revenue and business performance evaluations.
As analysts transition from research reports to social media, how do they ensure their public statements remain compliant with regulatory boundaries?
Traffic Beyond Bounds: Analysts' "Influencer-ization" and Compliance Risks
Analysts have moved from behind the scenes to the forefront, a result of changes in the way capital markets communicate. In the past, research views were mainly conveyed to a limited number of clients through formal research reports and institutional roadshows; today, a single conference call or social media post can reach a large number of investors in a short period of time. The expansion of the communication scope is not inherently a bad thing, but it poses higher compliance requirements for public statement registration, research report release procedures, and information retention.
So-called "internet celebrity analysts" typically refer to those who frequently express their opinions through social media and investment communities, have a large market following and personal influence, and even form "fan groups". Their views spread quickly and widely, but are also more likely to deviate from the research context, triggering compliance risks. Zhao YuYang, an analyst at Northeast Securities (000686.SZ), is a typical example of such an "internet celebrity analyst". Public information shows that she has worked at West China Securities (002673.SZ) and HuaXi Securities (002926.SZ), and joined Northeast Securities in May 2025, focusing on research areas such as AI computing power and liquid cooling, which are popular fields. She frequently expresses her opinions on social media channels such as WeChat friends circle and investment communities, and is known in the market as the new "A-share sales queen".
By the end of 2025, Zhao Yu Yang had been embroiled in internal controversy over the research coverage boundaries and "point allocation" of popular companies such as Hai Guang Information (688041.SH) and Guo Dun Quantum (688027.SH). Afterwards, his team mentioned in a research report on Li Nuo Pharmaceutical Packaging (301188.SZ) that the company was engaged in joint research and development with BOE (000725.SZ), but the description was publicly questioned by the securities affairs representative of BOE. When Zhao Yu Yang forwarded a trend chart of Sheng Quan Group (605589.SH) on social media, a transaction record appeared in the picture, sparking external speculation about industry professionals buying and selling stocks. In response to the controversy, Zhao Yu Yang said the information related to BOE came from corporate exchanges, and the transaction screenshot was not from his own account.
In July 2026, Zhao YuYang's registration category was adjusted from securities investment consulting analyst to general securities business. The Jilin CSRC subsequently issued a warning letter to him, citing "publicly making improper remarks," and required him to complete rectification and submit a written report within one month from the date of receipt of the decision.
Unlike Zhao YuYang, who was embroiled in a compliance controversy due to public statements and research report content, Tianfeng Securities (601162.SH) analyst Sun Xiaoya, once known as the "A-share sales queen," has exemplified the backlash of traffic against analysts. In July 2026, the market circulated news that Sun Xiaoya was "fined 800 million yuan for touting stocks." Tianfeng Securities subsequently responded, stating that the rumor was untrue, the company had filed a report, and Sun Xiaoya remained on the job as usual. In August, the Putuo Branch of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau issued an administrative penalty decision, imposing a 7-day administrative detention on a 38-year-old man for committing the illegal act of slander.
Although the rumor spreaders have been punished, Sun Xiaoya has borne the brunt of public opinion, damage to her professional reputation, and Tianfeng Securities has had to repeatedly clarify and file reports, all of which have revealed another side of traffic: it can rapidly amplify an analyst's influence, but also sweep them into a public opinion whirlpool overnight.
In fact, the "influencer-ization" of analysts is no longer an isolated phenomenon, as an increasing number of analysts are leveraging platforms such as Weibo, Douyin, and WeChat communities to build their personal IP, frequently speaking out and creating topics, prompting several mainstream financial media outlets to weigh in. The Securities Daily commented that some analysts "don't do analysis, only shout slogans," seeking attention and creating topics, which has disrupted the industry order; the China Fund News also published an article stating that multiple analyst public opinion incidents have triggered deep-seated concerns in the market about the "influencer-ization" trend of sell-side research.
The China Securities Industry Association's "Code of Conduct for Issuing Securities Research Reports" (hereinafter referred to as the "Code of Conduct"), revised and released in December 2025, clearly stipulates that securities analysts who use internet tools to provide services to clients must register with their company the chat groups, self-media accounts, cloud sharing platform accounts, and other related tools they use to provide securities research report services, and report the usage records and published content. Client service records should be archived for inspection. Only published research reports can be provided to and interpreted for clients, and unpublished views must not be disclosed in advance.
The "influencer-ization" of analysts in itself is not the problem, the key is that public expressions and publishing channels must be placed within a compliance framework.
"Paid Research Reports": Personal Violations and Securities Firms' Dereliction of Duty
"Paid research reports" refer to the violation where analysts accept commissions from the companies they are researching or other interested parties, receive payment, and then write and publish biased research reports.
A criminal case disclosed at the end of 2025 is a typical example. According to the judgment of the Shanghai Pudong New Area People's Court, a former chief analyst of the electronics industry, Zou, and an analyst of the electronics industry, Cheng, from a certain securities firm, accepted a commission to write a research report for LITONG Electronics (603629.SH) to increase its attention in the stock market, and received 180,000 yuan and 50,000 yuan, respectively. Both were convicted of bribery by non-state employees and sentenced to 10 months and 8 months with a one-year suspended sentence, and fined. Media confirmed that the institution involved was East Money Securities, whose parent company is East Money Information (300059.SZ), by comparing the personnel's resumes and publicly released research reports.
Analysts have been personally penalized, and the brokerage firms involved cannot shirk their responsibility. The fact that the individuals involved were able to utilize their positions to organize and promote the release of research reports exposes significant loopholes in the brokerage firms' compliance procedures for producing, reviewing, and releasing research reports. In practice, regulatory agencies have taken regulatory measures against multiple brokerage firms on several occasions due to issues such as inadequate prevention of conflicts of interest in research reports and dereliction of duty in personnel management. In May 2026, Guodu Securities (601788.SH) received a warning letter for failing to effectively prevent conflicts of interest between the release of securities research reports and other securities businesses. In 2025, Huaan Securities (600909.SH) also received dual penalties for research report violations and personnel management issues.
Such paid, customized research reports will have severe consequences for the capital markets. Investors see what appears to be an independent report, unaware that a commercial relationship lies behind it. This means investment decisions based on such reports are built on manipulated information from the very start. When more investors follow the trend and stock prices are artificially pushed higher, it is often unsuspecting retail investors who end up holding the bag. More seriously, this behavior erodes the credibility of the entire sell-side research industry—if investors cannot trust the independence of research reports, the very foundation of brokerage research is shaken.
In accordance with the Practice Guidelines, operating institutions that release securities research reports should strengthen management of the scope of research objects. When adding a listed company to the scope of research objects and making a securities valuation or investment rating, or when removing the listed company from the scope of research objects, the decision should be made independently by the research department or research subsidiary and undergo internal audit procedures.
Analysts who secretly accept money to write reports not only undermine research independence, but also cross the line of compliance and even criminal law; securities firms that fail to discover and stop such behavior in a timely manner will also be held responsible.
Competition intensifies: Point-based assessments squeeze research space
Another compliance risk for sell-side research stems from performance assessment pressure. According to Baidu Baike, "allocation points" refer to the mechanism by which buy-side institutions such as fund companies score the investment research services of securities firms' research departments and settle commissions accordingly. The system traces its origins to the "research-for-commission" model proposed in 1999. Buy-side institutions typically hold fixed scoring authority (such as 100 points) and allocate points to sell-side analysts or teams providing services according to internal rules—based on criteria such as the evaluator's position weight, the accuracy of research reports, and timeliness. The results directly determine the amount of commission business allocated to securities firms. The commission income earned from allocation points is then redistributed internally. This system places considerable performance assessment pressure on researchers.
Firstly, the growth of the "cake" for commission from securities underwriting is limited, and the competition in the research business of securities companies has further intensified. After the implementation of the new regulations for public fund commission reductions, the total commission from securities underwriting for securities companies in 2025 was 11.014 billion yuan, with a year-on-year growth of only about 0.25%. However, during the same period, the stock trading volume of securities companies' seats increased by about 47%, a typical case of "increased volume but not increased revenue." CITIC Securities (600030.SH), Guotai Junan, GF Securities (000776.SZ), Changjiang Securities (000783.SZ), and Huatai Securities (601688.SH) still rank among the top in the industry, but for more securities companies, in order to be included in the list of institutional clients, they have to increase their investment in research and customer service. The competition among analysts has also extended from a comparison of research capabilities to a competition in client resources, service frequency, and market influence.
Secondly, securities firms' reliance on commission fees from allocated trades increases the performance evaluation pressure on analysts. Analyst evaluations should be based on the quality of their research and professional judgment, but under the allocated trade commission and points system, the evaluation of analysts by securities firm research institutes relies heavily on scores from institutional clients. The level of these scores affects the proportion of performance bonuses awarded to analysts. To obtain more points, analysts must frequently conduct roadshows, organize conference calls, and respond to investors' questions. Whether research is popular among investors and whether their views can be promptly conveyed to buy-side clients sometimes has a faster impact on evaluation results than the solidity of the research itself.
Ultimately, this assessment pressure will squeeze the time analysts have to track industries, verify information, and test their judgments, inevitably affecting research quality and potentially leading to compliance issues. In order to be timely, attract attention, and earn points, analysts may form and disseminate opinions when their research basis is insufficient and information has not been fully verified, and even use exaggerated expressions to amplify market impact. Unclear positioning of analysts' responsibilities may also blur the boundary between research and sales, causing research conclusions to be influenced by client demands and commission interests. The resulting problems of insufficient basis, inappropriate expression, non-standard publication procedures, and compromised research independence may all touch the compliance red line of securities research business.
The core issue is how securities firms set boundaries for their positions. The "Practitioner Specifications" require business units to comprehensively consider factors such as compliance, research quality, client evaluations, and workload when establishing assessment and incentive standards for personnel involved in publishing securities research reports. Analysts can conduct roadshows, interpret research reports, and understand client needs, but they should not be driven by things like being forced to meet sales targets, competing for commissions, or vying for rankings. In the end, securities firms must generate revenue through research quality and professional capabilities, rather than relying on assessments that push analysts to become half-salespeople.
In conclusion
Research reports from securities firms are not content products manufactured to generate traffic, nor are they a promotional tool that listed companies can buy. Analysts speak with a professional identity, using the credit accumulated by their institutions over the long term, and their influence may affect stock prices and the actual investments of investors. Traffic, performance metrics, and revenue pressure cannot be used as excuses to cross the line.
To address these issues, it is not enough to simply remind analysts to exercise self-discipline; securities firms must change their profit and evaluation models, which are overly reliant on commissions and client evaluations, and truly incorporate research quality, compliance records, and independent judgment into compensation, promotions, and accountability. They must also plug the loopholes in the research initiation, information verification, conflict of interest declaration, and audit release processes. Only by making violators pay the necessary price and holding individuals responsible for flawed processes can securities research maintain its professional bottom line and the order of the capital market be effectively maintained.