Saint Bella Group (02508.HK) released its 2026 interim results on the evening of Aug. 31. Revenue for the first half rose 36.0% year-on-year to 611 million yuan, adjusted net profit increased 56.2% to 60.584 million yuan, and reported net profit fell 83.5% to 53.971 million yuan.
The same report showed a profit plummeting 80% and also surging 50%. The explanation for the plummet is not complicated: the same period in 2025 had a one-time gain of approximately 318 million yuan from the change in fair value of financial instruments, which propped up the base figure, prompting the company to guide the market to look at the adjusted metrics instead.
From the prospectus to the annual report and then to the semi-annual report, the company's external communication almost only uses adjusted figures, with statutory profits and adjusted profits diverging for years. The most noteworthy aspect of this semi-annual report is not growth, but the accounting treatment. After flipping through the accounting books page by page, you may find that financial engineering is perhaps the most refined product of this company.
Looking at the profits themselves, the 2025 annual report showed a net profit of 411 million yuan on the books, of which approximately 318 million yuan was a one-time gain from the change in the fair value of financial instruments prior to listing. After adjustments, the net profit was only 125 million yuan. In other words, about 70% of the "net profit of 411 million yuan" in the annual report was not earned through operations. By the 2026 mid-year report, the net profit on the books was 53.971 million yuan, and 60.584 million yuan after adjustments, with the two sets of numbers continuing to differ. Readers need to ask themselves: which year's reported profit is genuine.
The same company has several profit calculation methods
More intriguingly, the same accounting line item played diametrically opposite roles for this company. From 2021 to 2024, net losses were 119 million yuan, 412 million yuan, 239 million yuan, and 543 million yuan respectively, totaling roughly 1.3 billion yuan. The company attributed this mainly to fair-value changes of financial instruments issued to investors, describing them as non-cash items. Before the IPO, this line item produced massive losses; on the eve of listing, the same line item produced massive gains. When it generated losses, the company said it was non-cash and nothing to fear. When it generated gains, it was equally non-cash — should investors be equally quick to dismiss it?
Looking at the average transaction value, during the IPO period, the company disclosed the "average contract value of postpartum recovery customers for the Saint Bella brand", which was 472,000 yuan, 458,000 yuan, and 419,000 yuan in 2022, 2023, and 2024, respectively, declining for three consecutive years. After listing, this indicator was no longer disclosed, replaced by the ASP metric: the 2025 annual report showed that the average transaction value of the Saint Bella brand was 267,000 yuan, and the average transaction value of all brands in the first half of 2026 was 171,000 yuan, up 15.9% year-over-year, with the narrative changing to "quantity and price rising together". The statistical scope of the two metrics is completely different, with the former only covering postpartum recovery customers and the latter covering all customers and all brands. The company has never explained the reason for switching between the two metrics. The old metric declined for three consecutive years, while the new metric has continuously reached new highs, which is not a data contradiction, but rather a choice of disclosure.
The "global first" is also a product of rhetoric. According to Frost & Sullivan data, based on 2025 revenue, Saint Bella ranks first in the global postpartum care center industry with a market share of around 0.5%, while the top five companies combined account for only 1.3% of the market. The first place has a share of only 0.5%, which suggests that the industry is highly fragmented and lacks scale barriers, rather than the company having established a strong dominance. The title of "global leader in family quality care" is based on a set of customized rhetoric.
Operational metrics also raise questions. The mid-year report showed a second-time consumption conversion rate of 96.3%, with 94% of postpartum care customers purchasing STB's Yu Kang service. The conversion rate of 96.3%, which is close to a perfect score, did not disclose its statistical caliber. According to Qidian Peng, most postpartum care services are given away as gifts, and independent purchases are relatively rare. AI-powered physical examination contributed revenue of 6.9 million yuan, accounting for about one-thousandth of the total revenue of 611 million yuan, yet occupies a prominent position in the report. Additionally, the proportion of diversified income is also noteworthy: the mid-year report claimed that the proportion of diversified business income had reached 31.5%, but postpartum care income was 508 million yuan, accounting for 83% of total revenue. The difference between 31.5% and 17% depends on what is included in "diversified income", but the company did not provide a detailed breakdown.
The quality of growth also needs to be examined. Revenue increased by 36.0% year-over-year, but the number of stores grew from 96 at the time of listing to 140 by the end of 2025 and 148 in the first half of 2026, with the store network expanding by more than 50% compared to the same period last year. In June 2026, the company acquired Wuhan Freya, adding three standalone stores, 160 beds, and nearly 10,000 high-net-worth members. The total revenue generated by new store openings and acquisitions does not necessarily mean that individual stores have become stronger. According to calculations by NetEase Finance based on the prospectus, the company's average monthly revenue per store decreased from 2.59 million yuan in 2021 to 1.99 million yuan in the first half of 2024, indicating that growth at the individual store level is not as strong as the overall revenue growth.
The improvement in profit margin does not hold up to scrutiny. The adjusted net profit margin of 9.9% represents a year-over-year increase of 1.3 percentage points, appearing to indicate enhanced profitability. However, the gross margin for the same period was 36.2%, a year-over-year decline of 1.4 percentage points. The true source of the improvement in profit margin is cost compression: the marketing expense ratio was 11.3%, down 0.7 percentage points year-over-year, and the management expense ratio was 16.7%, down 5.4 percentage points year-over-year. The core business's ability to generate profits is weakening, and the profit statement is being propped up by cost-cutting, which is not sustainable in the long term.
Another reference point is cash flow. In the first half of 2026, the company's net operating cash flow was approximately 12.82 million yuan, while its net profit was 53.97 million yuan for the same period, with operating cash flow significantly weaker than net profit. The company's cash reserves on the books are also not substantial relative to its revenue.
Lastly, there's the buyback. The company approved a HK$1 billion buyback plan in June 2026, with a maximum purchase price of HK$6.85 per share, while the current price is only around HK$3.1, more than double the market price; the HK$1 billion accounts for about 0.5% of the company's HK$19 billion market value, indicating a symbolic gesture of supporting the stock price. Another set of numbers is also worth noting: the net proceeds from the IPO were approximately HK$6.3 billion, while the company's current market value is around HK$19 billion, meaning the money raised from the market back then is equivalent to about one-third of the company's current valuation.
Beyond the surface, the business foundation is not strong
Strip away the rhetoric, and the business is essentially like this.
Shengbella has 148 global stores, many of which are located in high-end hotels such as the Ritz-Carlton, Peninsula, and Mandarin Oriental. The pricing system includes the entry-level Xiaobella starting at 68,000 yuan, Aiyu starting at 98,800 yuan, and the main brand Shengbella's 28-day package starting at 168,800 yuan. According to a report by the Southern Daily, the Queen's package starts at 388,800 yuan for 28 days, with the 56-day version having a national highest quoted price of 768,800 yuan to 1,168,800 yuan. The list of publicly reported clients includes celebrities such as Qi Wei, Gina, and Tang Yixin. This is a business that has turned postpartum care into a luxury product.
But luxury goods also have their cycles. Data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows births totaled 9.02 million in 2023, 9.54 million in 2024, and 7.92 million in 2025 — the first time the figure has fallen below 8 million.
At the other end of the industry is a wave of closures: reportedly, about 90% of maternity centers are losing money; in January 2025, Ai Jia Maternity Center went bankrupt, affecting 67 stores across 22 cities in eight provinces; Hangzhou Maternity Center's collective closure became a trending topic; Ai Di Gong, once the "first listed maternity center stock," has been suspended from trading since February 2025. This industry's model has three inherent vulnerabilities: a prepayment system, where customers pay first and consume later; high rent, with leasing costs accounting for 35% to 40% of sales costs, and high-end hotel rents not being discounted due to declining birth rates; and low frequency, as maternity consumption has almost no repeat business, requiring continuous investment in customer acquisition.
Its compliance record is also far from clean, and most violations are documented. Corporate entities under the company have been penalized twice for practicing medicine without a license and once for false advertising, with the violations involving claims that could not be substantiated, including an ACI maternal and infant nursing certificate and statements about being the "only one partnering with MIT." In 2022, the company was ordered to pay 500,000 yuan to competitor Wei Ge for commercial defamation. Its subsidiary Guanghetang was fined twice for advertising violations. The prospectus disclosed that the company had extended loans to third parties. In the 2024 Yuege incident, the settlement plan—offering 40% cash compensation of the disputed amount on the condition that claimants waive their rights and delete negative content—was described by some parties as a "gag agreement." On Xiaohongshu, customer complaints cluster around several key areas. Yet such posts are now difficult to find; according to sources, customer service reaches out to posters individually for one-on-one communication.
These penalty amounts are generally not large, but in an industry where trust is an asset, they point to the same issue: whether the management scope of brand owners can keep up with their expansion speed.
Voting in the capital market has already begun. Listed on June 26, 2025, with an issue price of HK$6.58, the stock closed at HK$8.80 on the first day, with a market capitalization of HK$5.366 billion, but plummeted 25.45% to below the issue price the next day. As of September 1, 2026, the stock price is around HK$3.0 to HK$3.2, with a market capitalization of around HK$1.9 billion, down about 52% from the issue price, while the average target price of analysts is HK$6.32. Despite strong interim growth, the stock price has not moved, and the object of the market's "voting with its feet" may not be performance, but rather the quality of that performance.
The company also has some notable highlights, including an adjusted net profit growth rate of 56.2%, which is indeed high; its position as the industry leader is genuine; its cost control measures have been effective; and its revenue from family care increased by 59.1% year-over-year, while Guanghe Hall grew by 44.4% and overseas revenue surged by 244%, all of which are real advancements, albeit on a small scale.
The maternity care center business is a high-end but fragile industry: low frequency, service-intensive, prepaid, and heavily reliant on trust, and the industry is still in the midst of consolidation. It is a fact that Saint Bella's Black Cat has zero complaints, high adjusted profit growth, and is the industry leader in market share. It is also true that: approximately 70% of its annual net profit comes from one-time items, the customer price metric was changed after listing, operating cash flow is weaker than net profit, and the buyback cap is more than twice the current price, but the amount only accounts for 0.5% of its market value.
The discrepancy between the plummeting book value and the high growth after adjustments can be easily explained as an accounting issue. However, the divergence between the stock price and performance is a matter of trust, which is not so simple. The market is still waiting for an answer: when a 28-day, 168,800-yuan package meets an era where the birth population has fallen below 8 million, will this company's next 36% growth come from operations or from a change in accounting scope?