On the surface, Miniso appears to be maintaining its rare high-growth momentum in the consumer cold winter, but the capital market has given it a drastically different cold reception.
Under the guise of growth, the phenomenon of increasing revenue without increasing profits has become a summary of Miniso's current situation.
Our core views are as follows:
Miniso's revenue growth has real fundamental support, with overseas expansion and TOP TOY being the two major drivers, but the high costs of direct overseas operations are eroding profits.
IP strategy is a double-edged sword, with licensed IP contributing to revenue, but licensing fees and marketing expenses are wildly eroding profit margins.
The self-owned IP YOYO is a crucial piece for Miniso to transition from being a "logistics provider" to an "originator", but it currently remains a cost center that requires continuous financial support from its parent company.
Looking back at Miniso's actions over the past two years, it is clear that the management team attempted to offset cyclical fluctuations by chasing after consumer hotspots, but in hindsight, pursuing them too quickly has not been beneficial.
The two major engines simultaneously slowed down, with revenue growth hitting a three-year low
In the second quarter of 2026, Miniso recorded single-quarter revenue of 5.811 billion yuan, representing a year-over-year increase of 17%. The single-quarter revenue growth rate fell below 20% for the first time in three years, marking a new low.
In the first half of the year, domestic revenue was 7.28 billion yuan, up 24.4% year-on-year, while overseas revenue was 4.22 billion yuan, up 19.3% year-on-year, with the growth rate of overseas revenue slowing down more significantly.
Last year's second half saw Miniso collaborate with top global IPs such as Disney and Marvel, and adopt localized drivers, launching long robe pocket wet wipes for the Middle East and slippers for Southeast Asia, with its overseas revenue proportion reaching 42.3%, but so far this year, the revenue contribution has slid to 36.7%, underperforming domestic growth.
By brand, TOP TOY performed relatively well. The trendy toy brand, which directly competes with Pop Mart, recorded revenue of 990 million yuan in the first half of the year, up 32.7% year-over-year, with the number of stores increasing to 365. Within the Miniso system, TOP TOY is the fastest-growing business line and has the most room for imagination. However, compared to last year's nearly doubling growth rate, it has also shown a decline.
Two growth engines have both slowed to varying degrees, affecting Miniso's overall growth rate. The core reason behind the slowdown is the deterioration of core operating efficiency.
In fact, since last year, high growth overseas has masked the sluggish same-store sales performance:
On the one hand, while overseas growth is rapid, its quality is limited. In Q1 and Q2 of 2026, direct-store related expenses increased significantly faster than overseas revenue growth. According to management's statement at the earnings conference, the current profit contribution of overseas stores is only around 10%-15%, while revenue contribution is in the range of 35%-45%. This means that the more overseas stores are opened, the thinner the profits become.
On the other hand, the efficiency of domestic store expansion is becoming increasingly low. In the first half of this year, Miniso opened 97 new domestic stores compared to the end of last year, and the growth rate also showed a significant decline compared to the second half of last year.
IP premiums have not yet materialized, but costs and expenses have already risen in tandem
In the second quarter of 2026, Miniso's gross margin rebounded to 45.26%, representing a year-over-year increase of 98 basis points.
The true point of profit loss lies in the cost side, with sales and distribution expenses reaching 1.57 billion yuan in the second quarter of 2026, a year-on-year increase of 36%, and a fee rate increase of 373 basis points year-on-year. Looking at the first half of the year as a whole: the rent for directly operated stores increased by 100 basis points, promotion and advertising expenses increased by 50 basis points, IP licensing fees increased by 50 basis points, and equity-based compensation increased by 40 basis points.
Among these, IP authorization fees are the most rigid, with historical data showing that in 2024, the full year reached 421 million yuan, and in the first half of 2025, an additional 241 million yuan was spent, representing a year-on-year increase of 31.7%; in the first quarter of 2026, authorization fees grew 42% year-on-year, accounting for approximately 2.6% of revenue.
Miniso has established partnerships with over 180 global IPs. More than 90% of the IP products in its stores come from external IPs such as Disney, Sanrio, and Harry Potter. For each co-branded product sold, the company must pay a licensing fee. The more popular the IP, the higher the licensing fee, and the more products Miniso sells, the more money it has to pay to the copyright holders.
Miniso is essentially a laborer for IP parties, acting as a middleman. In comparison to Pop Mart, the gap is evident.
Pop Mart's revenue in 2025 was 37.12 billion yuan, up 184.7% year-over-year, with a gross margin of 72.1%. The MONSTERS series, which includes LABUBU, generated 14.16 billion yuan in annual revenue. Miniso's gross margin of 45% was 27 percentage points lower than Pop Mart's. Pop Mart sells its own IP, retaining most of the profit, while Miniso sells others' IP, earning only the labor income from channel distribution.
Miniso has put forward a product philosophy of "good-looking, fun, and functional." This framework was coherent enough when the company was selling affordable everyday goods, but in the context of IP retail, the first two attributes are what actually draw young consumers through the door. Whether a product works well functionally takes a backseat to the IP itself.
This highlights the crux of the issue - consumers are drawn to the IP, not to Miniso. The popularity of the IP determines foot traffic, and the IP licensor determines the profit margin, with Miniso merely serving as an executor in the chain.
Miniso is currently undergoing a radical transformation of its store formats, ranging from the high-end MINISO SPACE in top-tier business districts to the thousand-square-meter immersive park MINISO LAND, as well as MINISO FRIENDS targeting Gen Z, and then to Super Miniso, flagship stores, regular stores, and pop-up stores, with IP density decreasing gradually across the seven levels.
The higher the level of the store, the more priority is given to exclusive first releases and limited editions, with a higher proportion of IP products. Ordinary consumers who want scarce IP products have to go to the top three tiers, while regular necessities can be found in ordinary stores. This hierarchical logic sounds clear, but there is a fundamental contradiction that needs to be faced:
The large-store model has fundamentally altered MINISO's inventory turnover DNA. MINISO LAND's global flagship store on East Nanjing Road in Shanghai surpassed 100 million yuan in sales within nine months of opening, with projected annual GMV exceeding 150 million yuan — an undeniably impressive figure. However, such stores require roughly 2,000 square meters of space, prime downtown locations, and substantial rent and labor costs, which also explains the additional increase in marketing expenditures during the first half of the year.
As the company plans to expand its Miniso stores from the current 65 to 200 by the end of 2026, it is actually disrupting the past retail essence of Miniso, which was "small stores with high efficiency, quick entry and exit". Large stores bring experience, but prolong user retention time and inventory turnover days.
YOYO is not a solution at this stage
Miniso apparently realized the limitations of "helping others sell goods" and thus came up with YOYO.
YOYO is Miniso's first original artist IP, which launched its first series of products in June 2025. In the first quarter of 2026, sales reached 165 million yuan, and in June 2026, monthly sales in the Chinese market exceeded 100 million yuan. The annual domestic sales target is 600 million yuan, and with overseas sales, it is expected to reach 1 billion yuan. In less than a year after its launch, it has appeared at the Met Gala, Paris Fashion Week, and the CCTV Spring Festival Gala. Ye Guofu said this is "currently the fastest IP product to achieve sales of over 100 million yuan in the domestic market".
The speed is indeed fast, but being fast does not necessarily mean it is good.
This is largely due to relying on a "creating explosive fast-moving consumer goods" marketing strategy, with promotional and advertising expenses increasing 36% year-over-year in the second quarter of 2026. Adjusted net profit was only 529 million yuan, with the adjusted profit margin plummeting from 13.94% in the same period last year to 9.1%.
It is clear that having its own IP currently cannot be considered self-sustaining, and remains a cost center that requires continuous financial support from its parent company.
Ye Guofu has his own methodology for IP operations: "First, sign exclusive IPs or incubate proprietary ones; second, develop products; third, launch them in stores and track performance data simultaneously; fourth, run seeding and promotional campaigns for IPs with strong data."
The essence of this methodology is the logic of retail blockbusters, which involves data screening, concentrated marketing, and a competitive mechanism. It's like using the method of growing Chinese cabbage to grow trees, or using the ultimate efficiency of retail to operate IP. Growing Chinese cabbage can be done quickly, but growing trees takes time. IP requires users to spend time discovering, understanding, and possessing it, and injecting personal meaning into it. This process cannot be accelerated, as seen in the case of Pop Mart's LABUBU, which took a full 5 years from signing to becoming a hit.
YOYO is currently experiencing a typical case of "overexposure syndrome". When something that was originally a "small companion on the user's desk" is pushed onto the Met Gala red carpet, the user transforms from the owner into a spectator. On Xianyu, YOYO blind boxes have fallen to 50-60% of their original price, with free shipping. The hype created by marketing is retreating just as quickly.
More crucially, Miniso currently has 16 self-owned IPs, but only two or three of them are truly popular. The foundation of its entire IP-based transformation is built on an IP that may be declining. If Miniso fails to incubate a second IP of the same level before the popularity of YOYO fades, its strategy will be disrupted.
Haste makes waste.
It's clear that Ye Guofu has been a bit anxious over the past two years.
The acquisition of Yonghui, investment in an AI company, large-scale expansion of overseas direct operations, and aggressive promotion of its own IP YOYO, as well as the rollout of large MINISO LAND stores, all make sense individually. However, when viewed together, they indicate one thing: the company's leaders are seeking growth amidst anxiety, attempting to use speed to hedge against the uncertainty of the consumer market.
In September 2024, Miniso acquired a 29.4% stake in Yonghui Supermarket for 6.27 billion yuan. From Ye Guofu's site visit to inspect and adjust the operations of Pudong store at the end of July, to the official announcement on September 23, the deal was completed in less than two months; the transaction was completed in the first quarter of 2025, and Yonghui was consolidated into the financial statements using the equity method starting from the second quarter of that year.
A year later, the first results are in. Yonghui posted a full-year loss of 2.552 billion yuan in 2025. Miniso recognized an investment loss of 813 million yuan based on its shareholding. Net profit was halved from 2.635 billion yuan to 1.210 billion yuan, with Yonghui accounting for 57% of the decline.
Yonghui saw an improvement in 2026, but also experienced a trade-off, recording a profit of 253 million yuan, while its revenue declined by nearly 20%.
Miniso and Yonghui, one being a light-asset retailer selling IP-related peripherals and the other a heavy-asset supermarket selling fresh produce, have almost no overlap in their supply chains, operational logic, or user demographics. The synergistic effects of this investment remain unclear to this day.
Another investment in AI company MiniMax also resulted in a floating loss of nearly 600 million yuan for Miniso.
Meanwhile, Miniso's asset-liability ratio has risen from 42.85% at the end of 2024 to 65.6% in the 2026 mid-year report, as diversification that deviates from its main business is increasing leverage on its balance sheet.
Learning from Pop Mart, learning from Pinduoduo, investing in AI - Miniso has tried to replicate others' successful formulas on every popular track. However, there is no "copying homework" style of success in the business world.
Miniso has gradually come to realize its own problems, and its interim performance is expected to be average. The management team has conducted in-depth reflection on the slowing overseas business and explicitly stated that it will adjust its expansion speed and improve the profitability of single stores.
At the end of the day, Miniso's success relies on "supply chain efficiency" and "affordable pricing strategy". If it blindly pursues areas it is not skilled in, it will lose its supply chain and cost advantages, which is clearly a case of putting the cart before the horse.
Those who are impatient may run fast, but they don't necessarily run far. (Author: Sui Yu)